Often, we wish to design incentive-compatible algorithms for settings in which the players' private information is drawn from discrete domains (e.g., integer values). Our mai...
One attractive feature of market scoring rules [Hanson '03] is that they are myopically strategyproof: It is optimal for a trader to report her true belief about the likeliho...
We study the question of how to easily recognize whether a social unction f from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes is truthful, i.e. implementable by a truthful mechanis...
Trust between a pair of users is an important piece of information for users in an online community (such as electronic commerce websites and product review websites) where users ...
We introduce a class of voting rules called generalized scoring rules. Under such a rule, each vote generates a vector of k scores, and the outcome of the voting rule is based onl...
We examine a model in which multiple buyers with single-unit demand are faced with an infinite sequence of auctions. New buyers arrive on the market probabilistically, and are each...
Computer users express a strong desire to prevent attacks and to reduce the losses from computer and information security breaches. However, security compromises are common and wi...
We report on an extensive series of highly controlled human subject experiments in networked trade. Our point of departure is a simple and well-studied bipartite network exchange ...