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    SIGECOM
    2008
    ACM
    152views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
    On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
    13 years 11 months ago
    On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling
    Download  www.stanford.edu
    We characterize truthful mechanisms in two multi-parameter domains. The first characterization shows that every mechanism for combinatorial auctions with two subadditive bidders t...
    Shahar Dobzinski, Mukund Sundararajan
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    SIGECOM
    2008
    ACM
    155views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
    Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
    13 years 11 months ago
    Tight information-theoretic lower bounds for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions
    Download  www.cs.huji.ac.il
    We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidde...
    Vahab S. Mirrokni, Michael Schapira, Jan Vondr&aac...
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    SIGECOM
    2008
    ACM
    94views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
    Optimizing query rewrites for keyword-based advertising
    13 years 11 months ago
    Optimizing query rewrites for keyword-based advertising
    Download  www.cs.umd.edu
    We consider the problem of query rewrites in the context of keyword advertisement. Given a three-layer graph consisting of queries, query rewrites, and the corresponding ads that ...
    Azarakhsh Malekian, Chi-Chao Chang, Ravi Kumar, Gr...
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    SIGECOM
    2008
    ACM
    92views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
    Strong regularities in online peer production
    13 years 11 months ago
    Strong regularities in online peer production
    Download  www.hpl.hp.com
    Online peer production systems have enabled people to coactively create, share, classify, and rate content on an unprecedented scale. This paper describes strong macroscopic regul...
    Dennis M. Wilkinson
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    SIGECOM
    2008
    ACM
    108views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
    Optimal envy-free pricing with metric substitutability
    13 years 11 months ago
    Optimal envy-free pricing with metric substitutability
    Download  theory.stanford.edu
    Ning Chen, Arpita Ghosh, Sergei Vassilvitskii
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    SIGECOM
    2008
    ACM
    103views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
    A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
    13 years 11 months ago
    A sufficient condition for voting rules to be frequently manipulable
    Download  www.cs.duke.edu
    The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by ...
    Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer
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    SIGECOM
    2008
    ACM
    141views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
    On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome
    13 years 11 months ago
    On the communication requirements of verifying the VCG outcome
    Download  www.eecs.harvard.edu
    We consider the amount of communication required to verify the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism: an efficient allocation together with incentivizing VCG paymen...
    Sébastien Lahaie, David C. Parkes
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    SIGECOM
    2008
    ACM
    277views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
    Efficiency and redistribution in dynamic mechanism design
    13 years 11 months ago
    Efficiency and redistribution in dynamic mechanism design
    Download  www.eecs.harvard.edu
    Ruggiero Cavallo
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    SIGECOM
    2008
    ACM
    220views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
    Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
    13 years 11 months ago
    Better redistribution with inefficient allocation in multi-unit auctions with unit demand
    Download  www.cs.duke.edu
    For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
    Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
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    SIGECOM
    2008
    ACM
    88views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2008»
    Permutation betting markets: singleton betting with extra information
    13 years 11 months ago
    Permutation betting markets: singleton betting with extra information
    Download  people.csail.mit.edu
    Mohammad Ghodsi, Hamid Mahini, Vahab S. Mirrokni, ...
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