WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
We introduce the concept of a trust network—a decentralized payment infrastructure in which payments are routed as IOUs between trusted entities. The trust network has directed ...
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
In addition to useful Economic interpretation, auction based algorithms are generally found to be efficient. In this note, we observe that the auction-based mechanism can also be u...
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
We present a characterization of empirical price data from sponsored search auctions. We show that simple models drawing bid values independently from a fixed distribution can be...
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
Abstract. In this work, we consider singleton congestion games as a special class of (weighted) congestion games where each players' strategy consists only of a single resourc...
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
Abstract. We propose an extensive-form game as a model for pricing roaming charges in 802.11 wireless data networks. We specify utility functions for the three agents involved in t...
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
We study sequential auctions for private value objects and unit-demand bidders using second-price sealed-bid rules. We analyze this scenario from the seller’s perspective and con...
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
We consider a model of content contribution in peer-to-peer networks with linear quadratic payoffs and very general interaction patterns. We find that Nash equilibria of this gam...
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
We study equilibrium computation for exchange markets. We show that the market equilibrium of either of the following two markets:
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
In this paper, we study competitive markets - a market is competitive if increasing the endowment of any one buyer does not increase the equilibrium utility of any other buyer. In ...