Abstract. We address optimal group manipulation in multidimensional, multi-facility location problems. We focus on two families of mechanisms, generalized median and quantile mecha...
It is well known that standard game-theoretic approaches to voting mechanisms lead to a multitude of Nash Equilibria (NE), many of which are counter-intuitive. We focus on truth-bi...
Svetlana Obraztsova, Omer Lev, Evangelos Markakis,...
We show that a number of election-related problems with prices (such as, for example, bribery) are fixed-parameter tractable (in FPT) when parameterized by the number of candidate...
Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niederme...
To tackle the potentially hard task of defining the reward function in a Markov Decision Process (MDPs), a new approach, called Interactive Value Iteration (IVI) has recently been...
Hugo Gilbert, Olivier Spanjaard, Paolo Viappiani, ...
Abstract. We propose a framework for automated multi-attribute decision making, employing the probabilistic non-monotonic description logics proposed by Lukasiewicz in 2008. Using ...
Many mathematical frameworks aim at modeling human preferences, employing a number of methods including utility functions, qualitative preference statements, constraint optimizatio...
Thomas E. Allen, Muye Chen, Judy Goldsmith, Nichol...
In this paper, we address the problem of comparing the performances of two popular aggregation operators, the weighted sum and the Choquet integral, for selecting the best alternat...
Moving beyond the dualistic view in AI where agent and environment are separated incurs new challenges for decision making, as calculation of expected utility is no longer straigh...
In the obnoxious facility game, a location for an undesirable facility is to be determined based on the voting of selfish agents. Design of group strategy proof mechanisms has be...
Morito Oomine, Aleksandar Shurbevski, Hiroshi Naga...
The standard parameterization of the VERTEX COVER problem (Given an undirected graph G and k ∈ N as input, does G have a vertex cover of size at most k?) has the solution size k...