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AMEC
2004
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
Three Automated Stock-Trading Agents: A Comparative Study
Abstract. This paper documents the development of three autonomous stocktrading agents within the framework of the Penn Exchange Simulator (PXS), a novel stock-trading simulator th...
Alexander A. Sherstov, Peter Stone
AMEC
2004
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
Agents' Strategies for the Dual Parallel Search in Partnership Formation Applications
In many two-sided search applications, autonomous agents can enjoy the advantage of parallel search, powered by their ability to handle an enormous amount of information, in a shor...
David Sarne, Sarit Kraus
AMEC
2004
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
iAuctionMaker: A Decision Support Tool for Mixed Bundling
This paper presents iAuctionMaker as a novel tool that serves as a decision support for e-sourcing professionals on their pursuing of auction optimisation. Given a set of items to ...
Antonio Reyes-Moro, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguil...
AMEC
2004
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Comparison of Two Double-Auction Market Designs
In this paper we describe an analysis of two double auction markets— the clearing house auction and the continuous double auction. The complexity of these institutions is such th...
Steve Phelps, Simon Parsons, Peter McBurney
AMEC
2004
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
Bidding for Customer Orders in TAC SCM
Abstract. Supply chains are a current, challenging problem for agentbased electronic commerce. Motivated by the Trading Agent Competition Supply Chain Management (TAC SCM) scenario...
David Pardoe, Peter Stone
AMEC
2004
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
Specifying and Monitoring Market Mechanisms Using Rights and Obligations
Abstract. We provide a formal scripting language to capture the semantics of market mechanisms. The language is based on a set of welldefined principles, and is designed to captur...
Loizos Michael, David C. Parkes, Avi Pfeffer
AMEC
2004
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
Designing Auctions for Deliberative Agents
Abstract. In many settings, bidding agents for auctions do not know their preferences a priori. Instead, they must actively determine them through deliberation (e.g., information p...
Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
AMEC
2004
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions
Abstract. Current auctions often expose bidding agents to two difficult, yet common, problems. First, bidding agents often have the opportunity to participate in successive auctio...
Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes
AMEC
2004
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
Multi-attribute Bilateral Bargaining in a One-to-Many Setting
Negotiations are an important way of reaching agreements between selfish autonomous agents. In this paper we focus on one-to-many bargaining within the context of agent-mediated e...
Enrico H. Gerding, D. J. A. Somefun, Han La Poutr&...