An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions

Abstract. Current auctions often expose bidding agents to two difficult, yet common, problems. First, bidding agents often have the opportunity to participate in successive auctions selling the same good, with no dominant bidding strategy in any single auction. Second, bidding agents often need to acquire a bundle of goods by bidding in multiple auctions, again with no dominant bidding strategy in any single auction. This paper introduces an options-based infrastructure that respects the autonomy of individual sellers but still enables bidders to utilize a dominant, truthful strategy across multiple auctions.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2004
• Where: AMEC
• Authors: Adam I. Juda, David C. Parkes
• Keywords: AMEC 2004, Bidding Agents, Dominant Bidding Strategy, Information Management, Single Auction