How should a seller price her goods in a market where each buyer prefers a single good among his desired goods, and will buy the cheapest such good, as long as it is within his bu...
We design algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing sequential postedpricing mechanisms (SPM) in K-unit auctions, in a standard Bayesian model. A seller has K copi...
Identical products being sold at different prices in different locations is a common phenomenon. To model such scenarios, we supplement the classical Fisher market model by intro...
Sourav Chakraborty, Nikhil R. Devanur, Chinmay Kar...
This paper is about business modelling and negotiation protocol design in distributed scheduling, where individual agents have individual (potentially conflicting) interests. It i...
Edward P. K. Tsang, Timothy Gosling, Botond Virgin...
We study a pricing problem where buyers with non-uniform demand purchase one of many items. Each buyer has a known benefit for each item and purchases the item that gives the larg...
We present mechanisms, architectures, and an implementation addressing challenges with mobile opportunistic commerce centering on markets and mechanisms that support the procureme...
In this paper, we explore the use of the web as an environment for electronic commerce. In particular, we develop a novel mechanism that creates incentives for honesty in electron...
We consider marketplaces where buyers and sellers iteratively encounter to trade. Given some specific trade conditions, the question that we address is what strategies should buy...
Abstract. We study the use of viral marketing strategies on social networks that seek to maximize revenue from the sale of a single product. We propose a model in which the decisio...
David Arthur, Rajeev Motwani, Aneesh Sharma, Ying ...