WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider collusion in path procurement auctions, where payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show that collusion can increase the utility of the agents, and in som...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
Online auctions in which items are sold in an online fashion with little knowledge about future bids are common in the internet environment. We study here a problem in which an auc...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
We study the information content of equilibrium prices using the market communication model of Deng, Papadimitriou, and Safra [4]. We show that, in the worst case, communicating an...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
Trust propagation is a fundamental topic of study in the theory and practice of ranking and recommendation systems on networks. The Page Rank [9] algorithm ranks web pages by propa...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals. Our goal is to design auctions that are constant competit...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
In mechanism design, the goal is to create rules for making a decision based on the preferences of multiple parties (agents), while taking into account that agents may behave stra...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
We study the optimal pricing strategies of a monopolist selling a divisible good (service) to consumers that are embedded in a social network. A key feature of our model is that c...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
We design algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing sequential postedpricing mechanisms (SPM) in K-unit auctions, in a standard Bayesian model. A seller has K copi...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
Abstract. We study safety level coalitions in competitive games. Given a normal form game, we define a corresponding cooperative game with transferable utility, where the value of ...