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WINE
2009
Springer
178views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
Computing Optimal Contracts in Series-Parallel Heterogeneous Combinatorial Agencies
We study an economic setting in which a principal motivates a team of strategic agents to exert costly effort toward the success of a joint project. The action taken by each agent...
Yuval Emek, Michal Feldman
WINE
2009
Springer
191views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
Continuity Properties of Equilibria in Some Fisher and Arrow-Debreu Market Models
Following up on the work of Megiddo and Vazirani [10], who determined continuity properties of equilibrium prices and allocations for perhaps the simplest market model, Fisher’s ...
Vijay V. Vazirani, Lei Wang
WINE
2009
Springer
199views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
Externalities in Keyword Auctions: An Empirical and Theoretical Assessment
It is widely believed that the value of acquiring a slot in a sponsored search list (that comes along with the organic links in a search engine’s result page) highly depends on ...
Renato Gomes, Nicole Immorlica, Evangelos Markakis
WINE
2009
Springer
93views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
On Stackelberg Pricing with Computationally Bounded Consumers
In a Stackelberg pricing game a leader aims to set prices on a subset of a given collection of items, such as to maximize her revenue from a follower purchasing a feasible subset o...
Patrick Briest, Martin Hoefer, Luciano Gualà...
WINE
2009
Springer
179views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
Betting on the Real Line
We study the problem of designing prediction markets for random variables with continuous or countably infinite outcomes on the real line. Our interval betting languages allow tra...
Xi Gao, Yiling Chen, David M. Pennock
WINE
2009
Springer
128views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
Sequential Bidding in the Bailey-Cavallo Mechanism
Abstract. We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In [2] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions and for public project problems, and in each case so...
Krzysztof R. Apt, Evangelos Markakis
WINE
2009
Springer
111views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions
A potential downside of prediction markets is that they may incentivize agents to take undesirable actions in the real world. For example, a prediction market for whether a terrori...
Peng Shi, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo
WINE
2009
Springer
292views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
An Analysis of Troubled Assets Reverse Auction
Saeed Alaei, Azarakhsh Malekian
WINE
2009
Springer
134views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
Contract Auctions for Sponsored Search
In sponsored search auctions advertisers typically pay a fixed amount per click that their advertisements receive. In particular, the advertiser and the publisher enter into a con...
Sharad Goel, Sébastien Lahaie, Sergei Vassi...
WINE
2009
Springer
202views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
A New Ranking Scheme of the GSP Mechanism with Markovian Users
Sponsored search auction is used by most search engines to select ads to display on the web page of a search result, according to advertisers’ bidding prices. The income of this ...
Xiaotie Deng, Jiajin Yu