WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
We introduce an exploration scheme aimed at learning advertiser click-through rates in sponsored search auctions with minimal effect on advertiser incentives. The scheme preserves...
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
We consider the problem of assigning prices to goods of fixed marginal cost in order to maximize revenue in the presence of single-minded customers. We focus in particular on the...
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2007
Springer
We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path auctions, which measures the extent to which truthful mechanisms “overpay” compared to non-truthful mechanisms. In p...
WINE
2009
Springer
14 years 6 months ago
2009
Springer
Display advertising has traditionally been sold via guaranteed contracts – a guaranteed contract is a deal between a publisher and an advertiser to allocate a certain number of ...
WINE
2009
Springer
14 years 6 months ago
2009
Springer
We consider weighted linear congestion games, and investigate how social ignorance, namely lack of information about the presence of some players, affects the inefficiency of pure...
WINE
2009
Springer
14 years 6 months ago
2009
Springer
We study the geometrical shape of the partitions of the input space created by the allocation rule of a truthful mechanism for multi-unit auctions with multidimensional types and ...
WINE
2009
Springer
14 years 6 months ago
2009
Springer
We study the problem of allocating a single item repeatedly among multiple competing agents, in an environment where monetary transfers are not possible. We design (Bayes-Nash) inc...
WINE
2009
Springer
14 years 6 months ago
2009
Springer
We improve the best known competitive ratio (from 1/4 to 1/2), for the online multi-unit allocation problem, where the objective is to maximize the single-price revenue. Moreover, ...
WINE
2009
Springer
14 years 6 months ago
2009
Springer
We study the strategic behavior of risk-neutral non-myopic agents in Dynamic Parimutuel Markets (DPM). In a DPM, agents buy or sell shares of contracts, whose future payoff in a p...