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In the model of perfectly secure message transmission schemes (PSMTs), there are n channels between a sender and a receiver. An infinitely powerful adversary A may corrupt (observe...
Recently, Aumann and Lindell introduced a new realistic security model for secure computation, namely, security against covert adversaries. The main motivation was to obtain secure...
We introduce a new notion called -isolated proofs of knowledge ( -IPoK). These are proofs of knowledge where a cheating prover is allowed to exchange up to bits of communication wi...
Abstract. In this paper we prove that the sponge construction introduced in [4] is indifferentiable from a random oracle when being used with a random transformation or a random pe...
Guido Bertoni, Joan Daemen, Michael Peeters, Gille...
This paper proves "tight security in the random-oracle model relative to factorization" for the lowest-cost signature systems available today: every hash-generic signatur...
Consider an abstract storage device (G) that can hold a single element x from a fixed, publicly known finite group G. Storage is private in the sense that an adversary does not hav...
Ronald Cramer, Yevgeniy Dodis, Serge Fehr, Carles ...