SAGA
2007
Springer
14 years 6 months ago
2007
Springer
We consider applications of probabilistic techniques in the framework of algorithmic game theory. We focus on three distinct case studies: (i) The exploitation of the probabilistic...
SAGT
2009
Springer
14 years 7 months ago
2009
Springer
Abstract. We continue the recently initiated study of the computational aspects of weak saddles, an ordinal set-valued solution concept proposed by Shapley. Brandt et al. gave a po...
SAGT
2009
Springer
14 years 7 months ago
2009
Springer
Roberts’ theorem from 1979 states that the only incentive compatible mechanisms over a full domain and range of at least 3 are weighted variants of the VCG mechanism termed affin...
SAGT
2009
Springer
14 years 7 months ago
2009
Springer
SAGT
2009
Springer
14 years 7 months ago
2009
Springer
Abstract. This paper studies a setting where a principal needs to motivate teams of agents whose efforts lead to an outcome that stochastically depends on the combination of agent...
SAGT
2009
Springer
14 years 7 months ago
2009
Springer
SAGT
2009
Springer
14 years 7 months ago
2009
Springer
Let A be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, single-item auction, which given a bid-vector b ∈ [h]n , has expected profit E[P(b)]. Aggarwal et al. showed that given A, ...
SAGT
2009
Springer
14 years 7 months ago
2009
Springer
Abstract. A mechanism is manipulable if it is in some agents’ best interest to misrepresent their private information. The revelation principle establishes that, roughly, anythin...
SAGT
2009
Springer
14 years 7 months ago
2009
Springer
Abstract. In game theory, a player’s action is said to be weakly dominated if there exists another action that, with respect to what the other players do, is never worse and some...
SAGT
2009
Springer
14 years 7 months ago
2009
Springer
We study auctions whose bidders are embedded in a social or economic network. As a result, even bidders who do not win the auction themselves might derive utility from the auction,...