Sciweavers

AAAI
2012
12 years 1 months ago
A Robust Bayesian Truth Serum for Small Populations
Peer prediction mechanisms allow the truthful elicitation of private signals (e.g., experiences, or opinions) in regard to a true world state when this ground truth is unobservabl...
Jens Witkowski, David C. Parkes
ACMICEC
2003
ACM
158views ECommerce» more  ACMICEC 2003»
14 years 4 months ago
Mechanisms for coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace
In this paper we study the mechanism design problem of coalition formation and cost sharing in an electronic marketplace, where buyers can form coalitions to take advantage of dis...
Cuihong Li, Uday Rajan, Shuchi Chawla, Katia Sycar...
ATAL
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values
Interdependent values (IDV) is a valuation model allowing bidders in an auction to express their value for the item(s) to sell as a function of the other bidders’ information. W...
Florin Constantin, Takayuki Ito, David C. Parkes

Publication
270views
15 years 10 months ago
Optimal Auctions for Multi-Unit Procurement with Volume Discount Bids
Our attention is focused on designing an optimal procurement mechanism which a buyer can use for procuring multiple units of a homogeneous item based on bids submitted by autonomou...
N. Hemachandra, Raghav Kumar Gautam, V. Hastagiri ...