We propose a simple and intuitive cost mechanism which assigns costs for the competitive usage of m resources by n selfish agents. Each agent has an individual demand; demands are...
Marios Mavronicolas, Panagiota N. Panagopoulou, Pa...
Consider an information network with harmful procedures called attackers (e.g., viruses); each attacker uses a probability distribution to choose a node of the network to damage. O...
Marios Mavronicolas, Vicky G. Papadopoulou, Anna P...
— We propose a novel mechanism for routing and bandwidth allocation that exploits the selfish and rational behavior of flows in a network. Our mechanism leads to allocations th...
— In this paper, we propose a cost-based model to evaluate the resources that each node has to contribute for participating in an overlay network. Such a cost model allows to gau...
We consider a model of game-theoretic network design initially studied by Anshelevich et al. [2], where selfish players select paths in a network to minimize their cost, which is...
We consider a multicast game with selfish non-cooperative players. There is a special source node and each player is interested in connecting to the source by making a routing de...
Chandra Chekuri, Julia Chuzhoy, Liane Lewin-Eytan,...
— This paper reverse-engineers backoff-based random-access MAC protocols in ad-hoc networks. We show that the contention resolution algorithm in such protocols is implicitly part...
Ao Tang, Jang-Won Lee, Jianwei Huang, Mung Chiang,...
—We consider routing games where the performance of each user is dictated by the worst (bottleneck) element it employs. We are given a network, finitely many (selfish) users, eac...
We advance significantly beyond the recent progress on the algorithmic complexity of Nash equilibria by solving two major open problems in the approximation of Nash equilibria an...
Most work in game theory assumes that players are perfect reasoners and have common knowledge of all significant aspects of the game. In earlier work [Halpern and Rˆego 2006], w...