Cooperative games model the allocation of profit from joint actions, following considerations such as stability and fairness. We propose the reliability extension of such games, ...
Yoram Bachrach, Reshef Meir, Michal Feldman, Moshe...
Abstract. Congestion games model several interesting applications, including routing and network formation games, and also possess attractive theoretical properties, including the ...
Game theory is emerging as a popular tool for distributed control of multiagent systems. In order to take advantage of these game theoretic tools the interactions of the autonomous...
The Shapley Value is arguably the most important normative solution concept in coalitional games. One of its applications is in the domain of networks, where the Shapley Value is u...
Karthik V. Aadithya, Balaraman Ravindran, Tomasz P...
We consider collusion in path procurement auctions, where payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show that collusion can increase the utility of the agents, and in som...
Cost control for the Internet access providers (AP) influences not only the nominal speeds offered to the customers, but also other, more controversial, policies related to traffi...
Rade Stanojevic, Nikolaos Laoutaris, Pablo Rodrigu...
Three service providers in competition, try to optimize their quality of service / content level and their service access price. But, they have to deal with uncertainty on the cons...
Abstract. Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption that there are no externalities from coalition formation, i.e., that the...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Dorota Marciniak...
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems that exhibit externalities from coalition formation, i.e., systems in which the gain from forming a c...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Dorota Marciniak, Marcin Szamo...
We consider collusion in multi-unit auctions where the allocation and payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show how collusion can increase the utility of the collud...