In this paper we show how the usage of Residue Number Systems (RNS) can easily be turned into a natural defense against many side-channel attacks (SCA). We introduce a Leak Resista...
Abstract. A number of papers on side-channel attacks have been published where the side-channel information was not exploited in an optimal manner, which reduced their efficiency. ...
So far, efficient algorithmic countermeasures to secure the AES algorithm against (first-order) differential side-channel attacks have been very expensive to implement. In this a...
Elisabeth Oswald, Stefan Mangard, Norbert Pramstal...
During the last years, several logic styles that counteract side-channel attacks have been proposed. They all have in common that their level of resistance heavily depends on imple...
We demonstrate that masking a block cipher implementation does not sufficiently improve its security against side-channel attacks. Under exactly the same hypotheses as in a Differ...
Selecting a strong cryptographic algorithm makes no sense if the information leaks out of the device through sidechannels. Sensitive information, such as secret keys, can be obtai...
Cache attacks on implementations of cryptographic algorithms have turned out to be very powerful. Progress in processor design, e.g., like hyperthreading, requires to adapt models ...
Abstract. Software based side-channel attacks allow an unprivileged spy process to extract secret information from a victim (cryptosystem) process by exploiting some indirect leaka...
This paper announces a new software side-channel attack — enabled by the branch prediction capability common to all modern highperformance CPUs. The penalty paid (extra clock cyc...
Many side-channel attacks on implementations of cryptographic algorithms have been developed in recent years demonstrating the ease of extracting the secret key. In response, vari...
Francesco Regazzoni, Thomas Eisenbarth, Johann Gro...