In a previously reported user study, we found that users were able to perform decision tradeoff tasks more efficiently and commit considerably fewer errors with the example critiq...
We introduce a new class of games, congestion games with failures (CGFs), which extends the class of congestion games to allow for facility failures. In a basic CGF (BCGF) agents ...
We present the first design for a fully expressive iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language that is concise and expressive ...
David C. Parkes, Ruggiero Cavallo, Nick Elprin, Ad...
Algorithmic Mechanism Design focuses on Dominant Strategy Implementations. The main positive results are the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms and computationally ...
A set of jobs need to be served by a single server which can serve only one job at a time. Jobs have processing times and incur waiting costs (linear in their waiting time). The j...
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolov...
In this paper we consider a common form of the English auction that is widely used in online Internet auctions. This discrete bid auction requires that the bidders may only submit...
Esther David, Alex Rogers, Jeremy Schiff, Sarit Kr...
We present a new approach to representing coalitional games based on rules that describe the marginal contributions of the agents. This representation scheme captures characterist...
We study various computational aspects of solving games using dominance and iterated dominance. We first study both strict and weak dominance (not iterated), and show that checki...