For stable marriage (SM) and solvable stable roommates (SR) instances, it is known that there are stable matchings that assign each participant to his or her (lower/upper) median ...
We consider the stable marriage problem where participants are permitted to express indifference in their preference lists (i.e., each list can be partially ordered). We prove tha...
The hospitals/residents (HR) problem is a many-to-one generalization of the stable marriage (SM) problem. Researchers have been interested in variants of stable matchings that eit...
We study the problem of allocating students to projects, where both students and lecturers have preferences over projects, and both projects and lecturers have capacities. In this...
We study variants of classical stable matching problems in which there is an additional requirement for a stable matching, namely that there should not be two participants who wou...
Abstract. While the original stable marriage problem requires all participants to rank all members of the opposite sex in a strict order, two natural variations are to allow for in...
We consider the loss in social welfare caused by individual rationality in matching scenarios. We give both theoretical and experimental results comparing stable matchings with soc...