Sciweavers

WINE
2010
Springer
162views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
Near-Strong Equilibria in Network Creation Games
We introduce a new solution concept for games, near-strong equilibrium, a variation of strong equilibrium. Previous work has shown the existence of 2-strong pure strategy equilibr...
Ola Rozenfeld, Moshe Tennenholtz
AAAI
2006
14 years 28 days ago
Strong Mediated Equilibrium
Providing agents with strategies that will be robust against deviations by coalitions is central to the design of multi-agent agents. However, such strategies, captured by the not...
Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz
SODA
2007
ACM
115views Algorithms» more  SODA 2007»
14 years 28 days ago
Strong price of anarchy
A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst c...
Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour
DAGSTUHL
2007
14 years 29 days ago
Equilibria for two parallel links: The strong price of anarchy versus the price of anarchy
Following recent interest in the strong price of anarchy (SPOA), we consider this measure, as well as the well known price of anarchy (POA) for the job scheduling problem on two u...
Leah Epstein
WINE
2009
Springer
138views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 4 months ago
On Strong Equilibria in the Max Cut Game
This paper deals with two games defined upon well known generalizations of max cut. We study the existence of a strong equilibrium which is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. ...
Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot
ICALP
2007
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
Strong Price of Anarchy for Machine Load Balancing
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...
Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Meital Levy, Svetlana Olon...