We introduce a new solution concept for games, near-strong equilibrium, a variation of strong equilibrium. Previous work has shown the existence of 2-strong pure strategy equilibr...
Providing agents with strategies that will be robust against deviations by coalitions is central to the design of multi-agent agents. However, such strategies, captured by the not...
A strong equilibrium (Aumann 1959) is a pure Nash equilibrium which is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We define the strong price of anarchy to be the ratio of the worst c...
Following recent interest in the strong price of anarchy (SPOA), we consider this measure, as well as the well known price of anarchy (POA) for the job scheduling problem on two u...
This paper deals with two games defined upon well known generalizations of max cut. We study the existence of a strong equilibrium which is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. ...
As defined by Aumann in 1959, a strong equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that is resilient to deviations by coalitions. We give tight bounds on the strong price of anarchy for loa...