Sciweavers

ESORICS
2008
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
Formally Bounding the Side-Channel Leakage in Unknown-Message Attacks
Abstract. We propose a novel approach for quantifying a system's resistance to unknown-message side-channel attacks. The approach is based on a measure of the secret informati...
Michael Backes, Boris Köpf
CTRSA
2010
Springer
152views Cryptology» more  CTRSA 2010»
13 years 10 months ago
Differential Cache-Collision Timing Attacks on AES with Applications to Embedded CPUs
This paper proposes a new type of cache-collision timing attacks on software implementations of AES. Our major technique is of differential nature and is based on the internal cryp...
Andrey Bogdanov, Thomas Eisenbarth, Christof Paar,...
CHES
2006
Springer
111views Cryptology» more  CHES 2006»
13 years 10 months ago
Cache-Collision Timing Attacks Against AES
This paper describes several novel timing attacks against the common table-driven software implementation of the AES cipher. We define a general attack strategy using a simplified ...
Joseph Bonneau, Ilya Mironov
CSFW
2010
IEEE
13 years 10 months ago
Vulnerability Bounds and Leakage Resilience of Blinded Cryptography under Timing Attacks
—We establish formal bounds for the number of min-entropy bits that can be extracted in a timing attack against a cryptosystem that is protected by blinding, the state-of-the art...
Boris Köpf, Geoffrey Smith
POPL
2000
ACM
13 years 11 months ago
Transforming Out Timing Leaks
It has been shown that secret information can be leaked to external observers through covert timing channels. In this paper we are concerned with a kind of timing attack that want...
Johan Agat
CCS
2005
ACM
14 years 10 days ago
Improving Brumley and Boneh timing attack on unprotected SSL implementations
Since the remarkable work of Kocher [7], several papers considering different types of timing attacks have been published. In 2003, Brumley and Boneh presented a timing attack on...
Onur Aciiçmez, Werner Schindler, Çet...