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Abstract. We propose a novel approach for quantifying a system's resistance to unknown-message side-channel attacks. The approach is based on a measure of the secret informati...
This paper proposes a new type of cache-collision timing attacks on software implementations of AES. Our major technique is of differential nature and is based on the internal cryp...
Andrey Bogdanov, Thomas Eisenbarth, Christof Paar,...
This paper describes several novel timing attacks against the common table-driven software implementation of the AES cipher. We define a general attack strategy using a simplified ...
—We establish formal bounds for the number of min-entropy bits that can be extracted in a timing attack against a cryptosystem that is protected by blinding, the state-of-the art...
It has been shown that secret information can be leaked to external observers through covert timing channels. In this paper we are concerned with a kind of timing attack that want...
Since the remarkable work of Kocher [7], several papers considering different types of timing attacks have been published. In 2003, Brumley and Boneh presented a timing attack on...