WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
14 years 19 days ago
2008
ACM
We study the question of how to easily recognize whether a social unction f from an abstract type space to a set of outcomes is truthful, i.e. implementable by a truthful mechanis...
ESA
2008
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
2008
Springer
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains bot...
STACS
2004
Springer
14 years 6 months ago
2004
Springer
Abstract. We consider the problem of scheduling jobs on related machines owned by selfish agents and provide the first deterministic mechanisms with constant approximation that a...
IFIP
2004
Springer
14 years 6 months ago
2004
Springer
In this paper we investigate extensions of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms to problems whose objective function is not utilitarian and whose agents’ utiliti...
AAIM
2005
Springer
14 years 6 months ago
2005
Springer
In this paper we study the set cover games when the elements are selfish agents. In this case, each element has a privately known valuation of receiving the service from the sets,...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
14 years 6 months ago
2005
ACM
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
14 years 6 months ago
2005
ACM
We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense ...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
14 years 6 months ago
2005
IEEE
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
ICALP
2007
Springer
14 years 6 months ago
2007
Springer
In this paper, we consider the mechanism design version of the fractional variant of the scheduling problem on unrelated machines. We give a lower bound of 2 − 1/n for any fracti...