In this paper, we characterize strategy-proof voting rules when the set of alternatives has a multi-issue structure, and the voters' preferences are represented by acyclic CP-...
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem states that (in unrestricted settings) any reasonable voting rule is manipulable. Recently, a quantitative version of this theorem was proved by ...
In this paper, we apply a consensus model to decision-making in committees that have to choose one or more alternatives from a set of alternatives. The model does not use a voting...
Patrik Eklund, Agnieszka Rusinowska, Harrie C. M. ...
In this paper, we study a maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) approach to preference aggregation and voting when the set of alternatives has a multi-issue structure, and the voter...
A voting rule is an algorithm for determining the winner in an election, and there are several approaches that have been used to justify the proposed rules. One justification is t...
Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Arkadii M. Slinko
One way for agents to reach a joint decision is to vote over the alternatives. In open, anonymous settings such as the Internet, an agent can vote more than once without being det...
Sequential composition of voting rules, by making use of structural properties of the voters’ preferences, provide computationally economical ways for making a common decision o...
In 1876 Charles Lutwidge Dodgson suggested the intriguing voting rule that today bears his name. Although Dodgson’s rule is one of the most well-studied voting rules, it suffers...
Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Ka...
A classical result in voting theory, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, states that for any non-dictatorial voting rule for choosing between three or more candidates, there will b...
Recent results have established that a variety of voting rules are computationally hard to manipulate in the worst-case; this arguably provides some guarantee of resistance to man...