We consider approval voting elections in which each voter votes for a (possibly empty) set of candidates and the outcome consists of a set of k candidates for some parameter k, e....
Ioannis Caragiannis, Dimitris Kalaitzis, Evangelos...
Recent work by Procaccia, Rosenschein and Zohar [14] established some results regarding the complexity of manipulation and control in elections with multiple winners, such as elec...
Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosens...
Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alterna...
We determine the communication complexity of the common voting rules. The rules (sorted by their communication complexity from low to high) are plurality, plurality with runoff, ...
In an election held in a noisy environment, agents may unintentionally perturb the outcome by communicating faulty preferences. We investigate this setting by introducing a theore...
Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Gal A....