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WINE
2009
Springer
138views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
On the Impact of Strategy and Utility Structures on Congestion-Averse Games
Recent results regarding games with congestion-averse utilities (or, congestion-averse games—CAGs) have shown they possess some very desirable properties. Specifically, they hav...
Thomas Voice, Maria Polukarov, Andrew Byde, Nichol...
WINE
2009
Springer
140views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
Tighter Bounds for Facility Games
In one dimensional facility games, public facilities are placed based on the reported locations of the agents, where all the locations of agents and facilities are on a real line. ...
Pinyan Lu, Yajun Wang, Yuan Zhou
WINE
2009
Springer
184views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
Competitive Routing over Time
Congestion games are a fundamental and widely studied model for selfish allocation problems like routing and load balancing. An intrinsic property of these games is that players ...
Martin Hoefer, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Heiko Rögli...
WINE
2009
Springer
117views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
Envy-Free Allocations for Budgeted Bidders
We study the problem of identifying prices to support a given allocation of items to bidders in an envy-free way. A bidder will envy another bidder if she would prefer to obtain th...
David Kempe, Ahuva Mu'alem, Mahyar Salek
WINE
2009
Springer
196views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
Online Ad Assignment with Free Disposal
Jon Feldman, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. ...
WINE
2009
Springer
145views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
The Complexity of Models of International Trade
We show a range of complexity results for the Ricardo and Heckscher-Ohlin models of international trade (as Arrow-Debreu production markets). For both models, we show three types o...
Christopher A. Wilkens
WINE
2009
Springer
157views Economy» more  WINE 2009»
14 years 6 months ago
Mediated Equilibria in Load-Balancing Games
Mediators are third parties to whom the players in a game can delegate the task of choosing a strategy; a mediator forms a mediated equilibrium if delegating is a best response for...
Joshua R. Davis, David Liben-Nowell, Alexa Sharp, ...