Cryptanalysis of DES Implemented on Computers with Cache

This paper presents the results of applying an attack against the Data Encryption Standard (DES) implemented in some applications, using side-channel information based on CPU delay as proposed in [11]. This cryptanalysis technique uses side-channel information on encryption processing to select and collect effective plaintexts for cryptanalysis, and infers the information on the expanded key from the collected plaintexts. On applying this attack, we found that the cipher can be broken with 223 known plaintexts and 224 calculations at a success rate > 90%, using a personal computer with 600-MHz Pentium III. We discuss the feasibility of cache attack on ciphers that need many S-box look-ups, through reviewing the results of our experimental attacks on the block ciphers excluding DES, such as AES.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2003
• Where: CHES
• Authors: Yukiyasu Tsunoo, Teruo Saito, Tomoyasu Suzaki, Maki Shigeri, Hiroshi Miyauchi
• Keywords: CHES 2003, Ciphers Excluding Des, Cryptography, Data Encryption Standard, Side-channel Information