Strategic argumentation: a game theoretical investigation

Argumentation is modelled as a game where the payoffs are measured in terms of the probability that the claimed conclusion is, or is not, defeasibly provable, given a history of arguments that have actually been exchanged, and given the probability of the factual premises. The probability of a conclusion is calculated using a standard variant of Defeasible Logic, in combination with standard probability calculus. It is a new element of the present approach that the exchange of arguments is analysed with game theoretical tools, yielding a prescriptive and to some extent even predictive account of the actual course of play. A brief comparison with existing argument-based dialogue approaches confirms that such a prescriptive account of the actual argumentation has been almost lacking in the approaches proposed so far. Keywords Argumentation, game theory, predictive force

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2007
• Where: ICAIL
• Authors: Bram Roth, Régis Riveret, Antonino Rotolo, Guido Governatori
• Keywords: Argumentation, Artificial Intelligence, Claimed Conclusion, ICAIL 2007, Standard Probability Calculus