Agent Compatibility and Coalition Formation: Investigating Two Interacting Negotiation Strategies

This paper focuses on Coalition Formation paradigm as a market mechanism. Concretely, Coalition Formation occurs as part of a wider open world and may occur many times during the lifetime of a population of agents. This fact can in some circumstances be exploited by agents to re-use partial existing coalition and social relationships over time to improve Coalition Formation efficiency. The aim of the work is to analyze the dynamics of two concrete rational behaviors (Competitive and Conservative strategies) and, in particular, to investigate how agents in a heterogeneous population cluster together across multiple Coalition Formation episodes and varying tasks. Preliminary resuls are also shown regarding how agents playing distinct strategies interact with one another.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2006
• Where: ATAL
• Authors: Carlos Mérida-Campos, Steven Willmott
• Keywords: ATAL 2006, Coalition Formation, Coalition Formation Efficiency, Coalition Formation Paradigm, Intelligent Agents