A game-theoretic formulation of multi-agent resource allocation

This paper considers resource allocation in a network with mobile agents competing for computational priority. We formulate this problem as a multi-agent game with the players being agents purchasing service from a common server. We show that there exists a computable Nash equilibrium when agents have perfect information into the future. From our game, we build a market-based CPU allocation policy and a strategy with which an agent may plan its expenditures for a multi-hop itinerary. We simulate a network of hosts and agents using our strategy to show that our resourceallocation mechanism effectively prioritizes agents according to their endowments and that our planning algorithm handles network delay gracefully.

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2000
• Where: AGENTS
• Authors: Jonathan Bredin, Rajiv T. Maheswaran, Çagri Imer, Tamer Basar, David Kotz, Daniela Rus
• Keywords: AGENTS 2000, Agents Purchasing Service, Market-based Cpu Allocation, Mobile Agents, Security Privacy