A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Strictly Competitive Multiagent Scenarios

This paper is a comparative study of game-theoretic solution concepts in strictly competitive multiagent scenarios, as commonly encountered in the context of parlor games, competitive economic situations, and some social choice settings. We model these scenarios as ranking games in which every outcome is a ranking of the players, with higher ranks being preferred over lower ones. Rather than confining our attention to one particular solution concept, we give matching upper and lower bounds for various comparative ratios of solution concepts within ranking games. The solution concepts we consider in this context are security level strategies (maximin), Nash equilibrium, and correlated equilibrium. Additionally, we also examine quasistrict equilibrium, an equilibrium refinement proposed by Harsanyi, which remedies some apparent shortcomings of Nash equilibrium when applied to ranking games. In particular, we compute the price of cautiousness, i.e., the worst-possible loss an agent may...

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2007
• Where: IJCAI
• Authors: Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, Yoav Shoham
• Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Correlated Equilibrium, IJCAI 2007, Nash Equilibrium, Solution Concepts