The standard approach to computing an optimal mixed strategy to commit to is based on solving a set of linear programs, one for each of the follower’s pure strategies. We show t...
In a landmark paper, Papadimitriou and Roughgarden [2008] described a polynomial-time algorithm (“Ellipsoid Against Hope”) for computing sample correlated equilibria of concis...
Correlated equilibrium generalizes Nash equilibrium to allow correlation devices. Correlated equilibrium captures the idea that in many systems there exists a trusted administrato...
We present several new characterizations of correlated equilibria in games with continuous utility functions. These have the advantage of being more computationally and analytical...
Noah D. Stein, Pablo A. Parrilo, Asuman E. Ozdagla...
We exhibit the rich structure of the set of correlated equilibria by analyzing the simplest of polynomial games: the mixed extension of matching pennies. We show that while the co...
Noah D. Stein, Asuman E. Ozdaglar, Pablo A. Parril...
This paper is a comparative study of game-theoretic solution concepts in strictly competitive multiagent scenarios, as commonly encountered in the context of parlor games, competi...
Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, ...
We show how solution concepts in games such as Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, rationalizability, and sequential equilibrium can be given a uniform definition in terms ...
Ronald Fagin, Joseph Y. Halpern, Yoram Moses, Mosh...