Dynamic equilibria of group vaccination strategies in a heterogeneous population

Abstract In this paper we present an evolutionary variational inequality model of vaccination strategies games in a population with a known vaccine coverage profile over a certain time interval. The population is considered to be heterogeneous, namely its individuals are divided into a finite number of distinct population groups, where each group has different perceptions of vaccine and disease risks. Previous game theoretical analyses of vaccinating behaviour have studied the strategic interaction between individuals attempting to maximize their health states, in situations where an individual's health state depends upon the vaccination decisions of others due to the presence of herd immunity. Here we extend such analyses by applying the theory of evolutionary variational inequalities (EVI) to a (one parameter) family of generalized vaccination games. An EVI is used to provide conditions for existence of solutions (generalized Nash equilibria) for the family of vaccination games,...

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2008
• Where: JGO
• Authors: Monica-Gabriela Cojocaru
• Keywords: JGO 2008, Vaccination, Vaccine, Vaccine Coverage