Coercion Resistant End-to-end Voting

End-to-end voting schemes have shown considerable promise for allowing voters to verify that tallies are accurate. At the same time, the threat of coercion has generally been considered only when voting devices are honest, and in many schemes, voters can be forced or incentivized to cast votes of an adversary’s choice. In this paper, we examine the issue of voter coercion and identify one example method for coercing voters in a scheme by Benaloh. To address such attacks, we present a formal definition of coercion resistance for end-to-end voting. We then present a new scheme, extended from Benaloh’s, that is provably coercion resistant. In addition to providing accuracy and coercion resistance, our scheme emphasizes ease-of-use for the voter. Key words: end-to-end voting, coercion, privacy, cryptography

• Type: Conference
• Year: 2009
• Where: FC
• Authors: Ryan W. Gardner, Sujata Garera, Aviel D. Rubin
• Keywords: Coercion, Cryptography, End-to-end Voting, End-to-end Voting Schemes, FC 2009