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WINE
2010
Springer
174views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
Value of Learning in Sponsored Search Auctions
Abstract. The standard business model in the sponsored search marketplace is to sell click-throughs to the advertisers. This involves running an auction that allocates advertisemen...
Sai-Ming Li, Mohammad Mahdian, Randolph Preston Mc...
WINE
2010
Springer
177views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
Braess's Paradox in Large Sparse Graphs
Braess's paradox, in its original context, is the counter-intuitive observation that, without lessening demand, closing roads can improve traffic flow. With the explosion of d...
Fan Chung, Stephen J. Young
WINE
2010
Springer
152views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
Envy-Free Pricing with General Supply Constraints
Sungjin Im, Pinyan Lu, Yajun Wang
WINE
2010
Springer
251views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
The Complexity of Equilibria in Cost Sharing Games
We study Congestion Games with non-increasing cost functions (Cost Sharing Games) from a complexity perspective and resolve their computational hardness, which has been an open que...
Vasilis Syrgkanis
WINE
2010
Springer
213views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
The Efficiency of Fair Division with Connected Pieces
der the issue of fair division of goods, using the cake cutting abstraction, and aim to bound the possible degradation in social welfare due to the fairness requirements. Previous...
Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb
WINE
2010
Springer
178views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
Improved Hardness of Approximation for Stackelberg Shortest-Path Pricing
We consider the Stackelberg shortest-path pricing problem, which is defined as follows. Given a graph G with fixed-cost and pricable edges and two distinct vertices s and t, we may...
Patrick Briest, Parinya Chalermsook, Sanjeev Khann...
WINE
2010
Springer
201views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
Efficient Computation of the Shapley Value for Centrality in Networks
The Shapley Value is arguably the most important normative solution concept in coalitional games. One of its applications is in the domain of networks, where the Shapley Value is u...
Karthik V. Aadithya, Balaraman Ravindran, Tomasz P...
WINE
2010
Springer
220views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
Threshold Models for Competitive Influence in Social Networks
The problem of influence maximization deals with choosing the optimal set of nodes in a social network so as to maximize the resulting spread of a technology (opinion, productowne...
Allan Borodin, Yuval Filmus, Joel Oren
WINE
2010
Springer
241views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
Coalition Formation and Price of Anarchy in Cournot Oligopolies
Nicole Immorlica, Evangelos Markakis, Georgios Pil...
WINE
2010
Springer
274views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 9 months ago
Exploiting Myopic Learning
Mohamed Mostagir