When autonomous agents decide on their bidding strategies in real world auctions, they have a number of concerns that go beyond the models that are normally analyzed in traditiona...
We design algorithms for computing approximately revenue-maximizing sequential postedpricing mechanisms (SPM) in K-unit auctions, in a standard Bayesian model. A seller has K copi...
We study the classic mathematical economics problem of Bayesian optimal mechanism design where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-inte...
Shuchi Chawla, Jason Hartline, David Malec and Bal...
We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategyproofness...
We analyze the structure of equilibria and the price of anarchy in the family of network creation games considered extensively in the past few years, which attempt to unify the net...
Erik D. Demaine, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Hamid M...