Coalitional games raise a number of important questions from the point of view of computer science, key among them being how to represent such games compactly, and how to efficien...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
In the arena of automated negotiations we focus on the principal negotiation protocol in bilateral settings, i.e. the alternatingoffers protocol. In the scientific community it is...
Game-theoretic solution concepts, such as Nash equilibrium, are playing an ever increasing role in the study of systems of autonomous computational agents. A common criticism of N...
Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul...
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems with externalities (i.e., in systems where the performance of one coalition may be affected by other ...
Tomasz P. Michalak, Talal Rahwan, Jacek Sroka, And...