28 search results - page 4 / 6 » Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions |
IAT
2008
IEEE
14 years 4 months ago
2008
IEEE
We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols for non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder ...
ATAL
2003
Springer
14 years 3 months ago
2003
Springer
Auctions are useful mechanism for allocating items (goods, tasks, resources, etc.) in multiagent systems. The bulk of auction theory assumes that the bidders’ valuations for ite...
CORR
2008
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2008
Springer
One of the Multi-Agent Systems that is widely used by various government agencies, buyers and sellers in a market economy, in such a manner so as to attain optimized resource allo...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
14 years 3 months ago
2005
ACM
We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 9 months ago
2008
ACM
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...