We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategyproofness...
We develop a novel bidding strategy that software agents can use to buy and sell goods in Continuous Double Auctions (CDAs). Our strategy involves the agent forming a bid or ask by...
Perukrishnen Vytelingum, Rajdeep K. Dash, Esther D...
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have emerged as an important model in economics and show promise as a useful tool for tackling resource allocation in AI. Unfortunately, winner determ...
We consider the following allocation problem arising in the setting of combinatorial auctions: a set of goods is to be allocated to a set of players so as to maximize the sum of t...
Subhash Khot, Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markaki...
This paper describes the foundations of a market mechanism that was designed to stimulate more efficient provisions of forest ecosystem services to society. The proposed tool is a ...