We design and analyze approximately revenue-maximizing auctions in general single-parameter settings. Bidders have publicly observable attributes, and we assume that the valuation...
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
The use of genotypic populations is necessary for adaptation in Evolutionary Algorithms. We use a technique called form-invariant commutation to study the immediate effect of evol...
In this paper, we present an approved linear-time algorithm for statistical leakage analysis in the present of any spatial correlation condition (strong or weak). The new algorith...
We study the computational power of a distributed system consisting of simple autonomous robots moving on the plane. The robots are endowed with visual perception but do not have ...