Abstract. Current auctions often expose bidding agents to two difficult, yet common, problems. First, bidding agents often have the opportunity to participate in successive auctio...
Iterative auctions have many computational advantages over sealed-bid auctions, but can present new possibilities for strategic manipulation. We propose a two-stage technique to m...
This paper analyzes sequential auctions for budget constrained bidders, for multiple heterogeneous common value objects. In most auctions, bidders not only have valuations for obj...
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....
We show that the Vickrey auction, despite its theoretical benefits, is inappropriate if “antisocial” agents participate in the auction process. More specifically, an antisoc...
The aim of this research is to develop an adaptive agent based model of auction scenarios commonly used in auction theory to help understand how competitors in auctions reach equil...