149 search results - page 3 / 30 » On Mechanism Design without Payments for Throughput Maximiza... |
MOBIHOC
2004
ACM
14 years 1 months ago
2004
ACM
Bandwidth efficiency of wireless multicast can be improved substantially by exploiting the fact that several receivers can be reached at the MAC layer by a single transmission. T...
SIGECOM
2008
ACM
13 years 8 months ago
2008
ACM
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
MFCS
2009
Springer
14 years 3 months ago
2009
Springer
Algorithmic mechanism design considers distributed settings where the participants, termed agents, cannot be assumed to follow the protocol but rather their own interests. The pro...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
2010
Springer
We study a novel class of mechanism design problems in which the outcomes are constrained by the payments. This basic class of mechanism design problems captures many common econom...
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2008
Springer
Many important problems in multiagent systems involve the allocation of multiple resources among the agents. If agents are self-interested, they will lie about their valuations fo...