In this paper, we adopt general-sum stochastic games as a framework for multiagent reinforcement learning. Our work extends previous work by Littman on zero-sum stochastic games t...
We provide efficient algorithms for finding approximate BayesNash equilibria (BNE) in graphical, specifically tree, games of incomplete information. In such games an agent’s p...
Satinder P. Singh, Vishal Soni, Michael P. Wellman
Reinforcement learning can provide a robust and natural means for agents to learn how to coordinate their action choices in multiagent systems. We examine some of the factors that...
Abstract. Infinite-horizon multi-agent control processes with nondeterminism and partial state knowledge have particularly interesting properties with respect to adaptive control, ...
In 2-player non-zero-sum games, Nash equilibria capture the options for rational behavior if each player attempts to maximize her payoff. In contrast to classical game theory, we ...
Krishnendu Chatterjee, Thomas A. Henzinger, Marcin...