In this paper we consider the following maximum budgeted allocation (MBA) problem: Given a set of m indivisible items and n agents; each agent i willing to pay bij on item j and w...
Abstract. Combinatorial Auctions are an attractive application of intelligent agents; their applications are countless and are shown to provide good revenues. On the other hand, on...
Marco Alberti, Federico Chesani, Alessio Guerri, M...
Combinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auction mechanisms in multi-i...
We present a mechanism for auctioning bandwidth on a network-wide basis to end users or ISPs that will utilize it for the same time period. This mechanism consists of a set of sim...
Manos Dramitinos, George D. Stamoulis, Costas Cour...
We design and analyze approximately revenue-maximizing auctions in general single-parameter settings. Bidders have publicly observable attributes, and we assume that the valuation...
Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan