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AAMAS
2007
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
Auctions, Evolution, and Multi-agent Learning
For a number of years we have been working towards the goal of automatically creating auction mechanisms, using a range of techniques from evolutionary and multi-agent learning. Th...
Steve Phelps, Kai Cai, Peter McBurney, Jinzhong Ni...
ATAL
2003
Springer
14 years 25 days ago
Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
112views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2004»
14 years 1 months ago
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2003
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
A false-name-proof double auction protocol for arbitrary evaluation values
We develop a new false-name-proof double auction protocol called the Generalized Threshold Price Double auction (GTPD) protocol. False-name-proofness generalizes strategyproofness...
Yuko Sakurai, Makoto Yokoo
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
A novel method for automatic strategy acquisition in N-player non-zero-sum games
We present a novel method for automatically acquiring strategies for the double auction by combining evolutionary optimization together with a principled game-theoretic analysis. ...
Steve Phelps, Marek Marcinkiewicz, Simon Parsons