We consider a model of game-theoretic network design initially studied by Anshelevich et al. [2], where selfish players select paths in a network to minimize their cost, which is...
Graphical games have been proposed as a game-theoretic model of large-scale distributed networks of non-cooperative agents. When the number of players is large, and the underlying...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
We propose a formulation of a general-sum bimatrix game as a bipartite directed graph with the objective of establishing a correspondence between the set of the relevant structure...
We introduce a game theoretic model of network formation in an effort to understand the complex system of business relationships between various Internet entities (e.g., Autonomou...
Elliot Anshelevich, F. Bruce Shepherd, Gordon T. W...
We advance significantly beyond the recent progress on the algorithmic complexity of Nash equilibria by solving two major open problems in the approximation of Nash equilibria an...
We present a computational approach to the saddle-point formulation for the Nash equilibria of two-person, zero-sum sequential games of imperfect information. The algorithm is a ...
Abstract. In this paper we consider Nash Equilibria for the selfish routing model proposed in [12], where a set of n users with tasks of different size try to access m parallel l...
d Abstract) Kousha Etessami LFCS, School of Informatics University of Edinburgh Mihalis Yannakakis Department of Computer Science Columbia University We reexamine what it means to...
We consider the problem of computing all Nash equilibria in bimatrix games (i.e., nonzero-sum two-player noncooperative games). Computing all Nash equilibria for large bimatrix ga...
We study Nash equilibria and the price of anarchy in the context of flows over time. Many results on static routing games have been obtained over the last ten years. In flows ov...