Automated tools for finding attacks on flawed security protocols often fail to quately with group protocols. This is because the abstractions made to improve performance on fixed ...
In the analysis of security protocols, methods and tools for reasoning about protocol behaviors have been quite effective. We aim to expand the scope of those methods and tools. W...
We present complexity results for the verification of security protocols. Since the perfect cryptography assumption is unrealistic for cryptographic primitives with visible algebr...
We present a model checking technique for security protocols based on a reduction to propositional logic. At the core of our approach is a procedure that, given a description of th...
Logics for security protocol analysis require the formalization of an adversary model that specifies the capabilities of adversaries. A common model is the Dolev-Yao model, which c...
Knowledge flow analysis offers a simple and flexible way to find flaws in security protocols. A protocol is described by a collection of rules constraining the propagation of know...
Emina Torlak, Marten van Dijk, Blaise Gassend, Dan...
Automatic security protocol analysis is currently feasible only for small protocols. Since larger protocols quite often are composed of many small protocols, compositional analysi...
Suzana Andova, Cas J. F. Cremers, Kristian Gj&osla...
In the context of Dolev-Yao style analysis of security protocols, we consider the capability of an intruder to dynamically choose and assign names to agents. This capability has b...
We present a new technique for verifying correspondences in security protocols. In particular, correspondences can be used to formalize authentication. Our technique is fully auto...
We propose a partial order reduction for model checking security protocols for the secrecy property. Based on this reduction we develop an automatic tool that can check security pr...