Abstract— Replay attacks on security protocols have been discussed for quite some time in the literature. However, the efforts to address these attacks have been largely incomple...
Security protocols use cryptography to set up private communication channels on an insecure network. Many protocols contain flaws, and because security goals are seldom specified ...
The combination of two security protocols, a simple shared-key communication protocol and the Di e-Hellman key distribution protocol, is modeled formally and proved correct. The m...
Abstract. While there is a great deal of sophistication in modern cryptology, simple (and simplistic) explanations of cryptography remain useful and perhaps necessary. Many of the ...
In this paper we define a sequent calculus to formally specify, simulate, debug and verify security protocols. In our sequents we distinguish between the current knowledge of prin...
The events of a security protocol and their causal dependency can play an important role in the analysis of security properties. This insight underlies both strand spaces and the ...
We present the first type and effect system for proving authenticity properties of security protocols based on asymmetric cryptography. The most significant new features of our ...
Tagging schemes have been used in security protocols to ensure that the analysis of such protocols can work with messages of bounded length. When the set of nonces is bounded, this...
We introduce the on-the-fly model-checker OFMC, a tool that combines two methods for analyzing security protocols. The first is the use of lazy data-types as a simple way of buil...
This paper continues the program initiated in [5], towards a derivation system for security protocols. The general idea is that complex protocols can be formally derived, starting...
Anupam Datta, Ante Derek, John C. Mitchell, Dusko ...