We consider a model of content contribution in peer-to-peer networks with linear quadratic payoffs and very general interaction patterns. We find that Nash equilibria of this gam...
In this paper, we study competitive markets - a market is competitive if increasing the endowment of any one buyer does not increase the equilibrium utility of any other buyer. In ...
Abstract. We consider the problem of computing additively approximate Nash equilibria in non-cooperative two-player games. We provide a new polynomial time algorithm that achieves ...
A function is non-cooperative computable [NCC] if honest agents can compute it by reporting truthfully their private inputs, while unilateral deviations by the players are not bene...
We consider a crucial aspect of displaying advertisements on the internet: the individual user. In particular, we consider ad fatigue, where a user tires of an advertisement as it ...
When users click on poor quality advertisements, there is a hidden cost to the search engine due to the user dissatisfaction (for instance, users are less likely to click on ads in...
We study keyword auctions in a model where each advertiser has a value for every slot, which is not necessarily proportional to the number of clicks the advertiser expects to rece...
We consider the problem of designing auctions with worst case revenue guarantees for sponsored search. This problem differs from previous work because of ad dependent clickthroug...