We examine a formal model of sponsored search in which advertisers can bid not only on search terms, but on search terms under specific contexts. A context is any auxiliary infor...
Eyal Even-Dar, Michael J. Kearns, Jennifer Wortman
We observe that ranking systems—a theoretical framework for web page ranking and collaborative filtering introduced by Altman and Tennenholtz—and tournament solutions—a well...
We introduce an exploration scheme aimed at learning advertiser click-through rates in sponsored search auctions with minimal effect on advertiser incentives. The scheme preserves...
Jennifer Wortman, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Lihong Li,...
We consider the problem of assigning prices to goods of fixed marginal cost in order to maximize revenue in the presence of single-minded customers. We focus in particular on the...
We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path auctions, which measures the extent to which truthful mechanisms “overpay” compared to non-truthful mechanisms. In p...