We study Facility Location games, where a number of facilities are placed in a metric space based on locations reported by strategic agents. A mechanism maps the agents' locat...
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give...
George Christodoulou, Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmou...
We consider profit-maximization problems for combinatorial auctions with non-single minded valuation functions and limited supply. We obtain fairly general results that relate the ...
Khaled M. Elbassioni, Mahmoud Fouz, Chaitanya Swam...
Abstract. We present a new technique for analyzing the rate of convergence of local dynamics in bargaining networks. The technique reduces balancing in a bargaining network to opti...
Abstract. We study the interaction between network effects and external incentives on file sharing behavior in Peerto-Peer (P2P) networks. Many current or envisioned P2P networks r...
Abstract. Most existing market maker mechanisms for prediction markets are designed for events with a finite number of outcomes. All known attempts on designing market makers for f...
Abstract. We show a formal duality between certain equilibrium concepts, including the correlated and coarse correlated equilibrium, and analysis frameworks for proving bounds on t...
We introduce a new solution concept for games, near-strong equilibrium, a variation of strong equilibrium. Previous work has shown the existence of 2-strong pure strategy equilibr...
We propose a new proxy bidding mechanism to allocate courses to students given students' reported preferences. Our mechanism is motivated by a specific strategic downgrading m...
Scott Duke Kominers, Mike Ruberry, Jonathan Ullman
In this paper, we characterize strategy-proof voting rules when the set of alternatives has a multi-issue structure, and the voters' preferences are represented by acyclic CP-...