Simultaneous Ad Auctions

Different search engines conduct similar ad auctions simultaneously and advertisers have to choose in which search engine(s) to run their ad campaign. In this paper we discuss two models for a pair of simultaneous ad auctions, A and B: (i) singlecampaign advertisers, which participate in a single ad auction, and (ii) multi-campaign advertisers, which participate in both auctions. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric equilibrium in the first model. Moreover, when the click-through rates in A are point-wise higher than those in B, we prove that the expected revenue in A is greater than the expected revenue in B in this equilibrium. In contrast, we show that higher click-rates do not necessarily imply higher revenues in the second model.

• Type: Journal
• Year: 2011
• Where: MOR
• Authors: Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz
• Keywords: Ad Auction, Intelligent Agents, MOR 2011, Search Engine, Similar Ad Auctions